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ABSTRACT
Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability of remembering personal past events or thinking 
about possible personal future happenings. This mental property is possible due to our 
capacity to be aware of subjective time, which enables us to experience the flow of time, 
to conceive non-present times, and to process time as a dimension of real world phe-
nomena. Temporal cognition encompasses the mental functions which rely on temporal 
information enabling the experience of the temporal flow and the processing of the tem-
poral dimension of external phenomena. Given the broad range of our time experiences 
and, hence, the broad scope of our temporal cognition, it is expected that certain kinds of 
temporal information can be of particular importance when we mentally transport ourselves 
to events in the past or future, whereas others could be unrelated to this mental property. 
The present paper seeks to situate the process of MTT within human temporal cognition. 
This will be done by identifying the commonalities and differences in the neural correlates 
of MTT and those of the three main subjective time processing systems, namely metric tim-
ing, ordinal timing and autobiographical timing.
Keywords: mental time travel, time perception, temporal cognition.
RESUMO
Viagem mental no tempo (VMT) diz respeito à habilidade de se lembrar de eventos pessoais 
do passado ou pensar sobre possíveis acontecimentos pessoais futuros. Essa propriedade 
mental é possível devido a nossa capacidade de estar ciente do tempo subjetivo, o que nos 
permite ter a experiência do fluxo do tempo, conceber tempos não presentes e processar 
‘tempo’ como uma dimensão de fenômenos do mundo real. Dada a vasta gama das nossas 
experiências temporais e, portanto, o amplo escopo da nossa cognição temporal, é de se 
esperar que alguns tipos de informação temporal sejam de particular importância quando 
nos transportamos mentalmente para eventos no passado ou futuro, enquanto que outros 
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Introduction2
Mental time travel (MTT) is a psychological concept 
coined by Endel Tulving (1993) from his own formulation of 
the nature of episodic memory. Since the late nineties, it has 
received considerable attention in the cognitive psychology 
literature and has been further investigated and developed 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997). MTT refers to the abili-
ty to mentally reconstruct personal past events and mentally 
construct possible future events. Thus, it is directed towards 
personal non-present times and it is only possible due to 
our capacity to process time as a dimension of real world 
phenomena (Szpunar, 2011). Several authors agree that the 
phenomenal a ect of MTT goes beyond the mere content of 
the recollection or future thinking in question (i.e., the what, 
where and when tied to the event). It is said that the phenom-
enal a ect that accompanies the content requires chrones-
thesia and autonoetic awareness3. Another concept tangled 
to that of MTT is the concept of episodic memory, which 
refers to conscious recollection of  ecific episodes in one’s 
personal past. Indeed, it could be assumed that when MTT is 
directed toward the past it is termed episodic memory (Sud-
dendorf et al., 2009).
As it is a general mental faculty which depends upon 
subjective time perception, one might wonder to what extent 
and by which means MTT is related to the broader concept 
of temporal cognition. Temporal cognition encompasses the 
mental functions which rely on temporal information en-
abling the experience of the temporal flow and the process-
ing of the temporal dimension of external phenomena (Ma-
niadakis and Trahanias, 2011; Matthews and Meck, 2016). 
It includes subjective time perception (e.g., judgements about 
temporal order and duration) as well as memory processes 
(e.g., working memory and episodic memory). Although psy-
chological and neurobiological studies have made consider-
able progress in elucidating the role of episodic memory and 
pro ective thought in MTT, the contribution of time per-
ception itself to MTT still remains elusive. This is in part due 
to the fact that time perception has often been investigated 
and discussed in relative isolation from the mnemonic a ects 
of temporal cognition (Matthews and Meck, 2016).
The present article aims at addressing the question of 
which kind of temporal information is of particular impor-
tance when we mentally transport ourselves to events in the 
past or future in order to situate MTT within the broader 
theoretical framework of human temporal cognition. This 
will be done by identifying the commonalities and differences 
in the neural correlates of MTT and those of the three main 
subjective time processing systems: (i) the processing of tem-
poral order in past and future events, which is the event-se-
quencing a ect of time perception, (ii) the processing of 
interval timing of events, which is the a ect of duration 
estimation of time perception, and (iii) the processing of the 
temporal dimension of episodic memories, which includes 
the encoding of temporal context information as well as the 
encoding of the passage of time. The article is structured as 
follows. First, the neurobiological substrates of temporal or-
der and interval timing, which are part of the so-called “per-
ception of time” literature, will be reviewed. Then, the neural 
correlates of episodic memory will be presented, followed by 
the discussion of neuroimaging studies on self-related mem-
ory, imagination and MTT. Finally, I will compare the neural 
bases of MTT and episodic memory with those of perception 
of time. Elucidating the type of temporal information MTT 
is dependent on is crucial to understand how MTT is related 
to temporal cognition.
Perception of time of external 
events: Definition of terms and 
neurobiological substrates
Although we all have a sense of time, our bodies are 
not equipped with a sensory system for detecting time in the 
podem ser irrelevantes para essa propriedade mental. O presente artigo busca situar o pro-
cesso de VMT dentro da cognição temporal humana. Isto será feito identificando-se con-
vergências e divergências dos correlatos neurais da VMT com aqueles dos três principais 
sistemas neurais de processamento temporal, a saber, temporização métrica, temporização 
ordinal e temporização autobiográfica.
Palavras-chave: viagem mental no tempo, percepção temporal, cognição temporal.
2 Abbreviations used in this article:  BG = Basal ganglia, DMN = Default mode network, MTT = Mental time travel, SMA = Supplemen-
tary motor area, TPJ = Temporal parietal junction.
3 Chronesthesia could be understood as the cognitive capacity to be aware of one’s subjective time, i.e., a subjective sense of past, 
present and future times. Thus, chronesthesia is a broader mental function which would be the basis – or the medium, as Tulving and Kim 
(2007) put it – that makes personal past recollection and future prospection possible. Autonoetic awareness is the subjective conscious 
experience of an event – hence, it describes not the general awareness of subjective time but the awareness of one’s existence in this 
subjective time.
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same way we detect light and sound – i.e., time is not a type 
of material object of the world for which there are  ecifi-
cally dedicated sense organs, receptors and sensory cortices. 
Yet the perception of the passage of time by the experiencing 
subject is as obvious as the colour of an object or the timbre 
of a sound. How is temporal information represented in the 
subject’s brain?
First of all, it is important to make clear that “temporal 
processing” is not a monolithic concept. It comprises several 
chara eristics of timing that can be functionally4 disman-
tled. Studies on perception of time consider a more general 
distinction between duration estimation (how long an event 
lasts, or when an event is likely to occur), which involves anal-
ysis of elapsed time and requires a metrical representation 
of time, and temporal order judgement (order of successive 
events in a series), which requires an ordinal representation of 
time (Ivry and Spencer, 2004; Coull et al., 2011). It is also im-
portant to note that these studies employ supra-second time 
intervals, that is, intervals spanning a few seconds. This means 
that the temporal processing mechanisms of interest rely on 
conscious encoding of duration, which require cognitive con-
trol (as opposed to sub-second intervals which are embedded 
in automatic sensory processes and a ion plans5).
Within metrical timing, two functional distinctions 
have been made. The first is a distinction between “explic-
it” and “implicit” timing, whereas the second is a distinction 
between “perceptual” and “motor” timing. These functional 
concepts are defined as follows. Explicit timing refers to overt 
estimations of duration required from subjects during a tem-
poral task (the task’s goal is to estimate elapsed time). Being 
asked to estimate for how long the red traffic light stayed on 
is an example of explicit timing. Contrarily, implicit timing 
regards the implicit engagement of timing mechanisms in 
a task which has an inherent temporal structure (the task’s 
goal is non-temporal, but temporal expectation is induced by 
temporal elements such as  eed or rhythm). For instance, 
crossing a busy streets requires an implicit interval estima-
tion (expectation) given by the position and  eed of vehicles. 
Both explicit and implicit timing tasks may require subjects to 
either provide a perceptual judgement or to perform a motor 
act, which have been referred to as “perceptual timing” and 
“motor timing”, re ectively.
Still regarding metrical timing, neuroimaging studies 
of explicit duration estimation have revealed a core6 corti-
costriatal network composed of the basal ganglia (BG), the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), and the right-lateralized 
inferior frontal cortex. Studies of implicit timing (or temporal 
expectation) have also implicated a core network constituted 
by the BG and the SMA, together with the cerebellum, and 
the left-lateralized premotor and parietal cortices (Coull et 
al., 2011). The BG and the SMA participate in both types of 
metrical timing, independently whether perceptual or motor 
responses were given. These two brain regions have been as-
sociated with distinct stages of the pacemaker–accumulator 
model (Buhusi and Meck, 2005). According to the model, 
the pacemaker BG participates in the encoding phase of long-
term memory of duration (i.e., creation of our “offline” ref-
erence of duration) whereas the SMA is involved in keeping 
the elapsing time of a current stimulus in short-term memory 
(accumulation) and comparing this “online” duration with the 
“offline” reference of duration.
In addition to metrical timing, the other component 
of perception of time is ordinal timing. Being able to judge 
whether two events are simultaneous or successive is crucial to 
the moment-to-moment interpretation of the sensory world. 
Neuroimaging studies have pointed towards a core brain 
region involved in judgments of the temporal order of two 
stimuli, irre ective of the sensory modality: the right-later-
alized temporal parietal junction (TPJ). The demonstration 
of the role of the right inferior parietal lobe (which is part of 
the TPJ) in judgments of temporal order has been so robust 
that this region has been considered the “when” pathway of 
the visual system (in addition to the well-known “where” and 
“what” pathways) (Battelli et al., 2007).
It is clear that metric and ordinal timing engage different 
brain regions, or two distinct functional systems. Nonetheless 
these brain regions have also been described as the neural 
components of either of two major networks, namely the sa-
lience network and the motor control network. The salience 
network is a ive whenever worldly stimulation demands 
awareness. Amongst the myriad of sensory information we 
are constantly bombarded with, only a tiny part is actually 
relevant for our goals and interests. The salience network is 
involved in selecting what matters in a given context. It is 
composed of frontal and parietal cortices which exert top-
down modulation of attention and working memory. Re-
garding the motor control network, it is engaged not only by 
a ions per se, a ion planning or a ion emulation, but also by 
prediction of the unfolding of external events, both biological 
and non-biological (Schubotz, 2007). We live in a dynamic 
4 By functional I mean mapped using functional neuroimaging techniques (e.g., PET, fMRI, ERP). Such techniques allow researchers to 
investigate the set of brain regions which robustly correlate with certain mental functions delivered via a perceptual or cognitive task. 
The set of brain regions can be referred to as functional system (e.g., the functional system of attentional control).
5 Different types of perception and behaviour implicate different ranges of time intervals. The estimation of the duration of a few hundreds 
of milliseconds (i.e., sub-second) is called “automatic timing” and is crucial for motor control in automated motor sequences (e.g., walking 
on the street, speech perception and production). Estimating the duration of over a few seconds (i.e., supra-second) is called “cognitively 
controlled timing”. It requires attention and working memory and is necessary for conscious time estimation and decision making.
6 By “core” network I mean regions that are recruited by different types of motor and perceptual tasks, and irrespective of the sensory 
modality in which stimuli were presented. Thus, core network would refer to a context-independent, supramodal representation of 
duration (in explicit timing) and of temporal expectation (in implicit timing).
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world, and anticipating future states of relevant events is im-
portant to grasp the causal relationship between the dynamic 
behaviour of our body and the environment, as well as their 
consequences. The salience and the motor control networks 
work together since selecting what matters in a given context 
involves capturing its dynamic a ects.
Thus, the core timing network utterly overlaps the sa-
lience network and the motor control network. What does 
this embedment suggest? It could be interpreted by consid-
ering “timing” (i.e., subjective time perception) an essential 
component of human cognition which underlies mental 
functions such as attention, working memory and anticipa-
tion of external events. In other words, processing of tempo-
ral information could be seen as a central subcomponent of 
these mental functions. In fact, empirically  eaking, the con-
cept of timing cannot be easily untangled from the concepts 
of attention and working memory (Coull et al., 2011). This 
conceptual interdependence suggests that “timing” is not an 
inaccessible foundational component: At the same time that 
“timing” underlies certain mental functions, it is also modu-
lated by these very functions. This makes it quite challenging 
to accept “timing” as an encapsulated neurobiological mech-
anism. Rather, given the empirical evidence, it is more tena-
ble to conceive or approach the questions on where and how 
“timing” is represented in the brain in relation to mental func-
tions (i.e., attention and working memory) to which it seems 
to be deeply bound up with. In other words, trying to escape 
conceptual circularity on the search for the neurobiological 
mechanisms of time perception is a thorny task.
The concept of episodic memory 
and its neurobiological substrates
The intuition that the concept of memory is rather 
broad and does not correspond to only a single mental facul-
ty is an old one. Experimental inquiry by cognitive neurosci-
ence, complementary to philosophical questioning and psy-
chological explorations, has been crucial in understanding the 
neural a ect of memory systems. The modern experimental 
approach has begun with the famous patient H.M. (Henry 
Gustav Molaison), who in 1953, and at the age of 27, under-
went a bilateral medial temporal lobectomy due to epilepsy. 
The successful surgery made him an anterograde amnesic pa-
tient, but despite his amnesia he could still learn new motor 
skills with pra ice, as well as maintain and manipulate in-
formation for a few minutes (i.e., hold a conversation). These 
observations showed that memory was not a unitary con-
struct. First, it could be understood in terms of accessibility of 
temporary and permanent information to the subject. These 
two types of memory are called short- and long-term memo-
ry, re ectively, and they involve separate neural mechanisms 
and are independently processed. Second, long-term mem-
ory includes motor (non-declarative or implicit) and cogni-
tive (declarative or explicit) forms of memory. Later, affective 
mnemonic properties, usually acquired as subtle associations, 
were included as another form of non-declarative memory. 
The declarative form of long-term memory is also called au-
tobiographical memory, since it concerns recollections of  e-
cific personal events and facts. In the 1970s, Tulving (1972) 
sugge ed that autobiographical memory should be separated 
into episodic (particular events or episodes about the self ) and 
semantic (facts about the self and the world) systems.
Since then, autobiographical memory has been concep-
tualized and empirically approached in terms of, on one hand, 
recalling personal semantic information linked to feelings of 
familiarity and of, on the other hand, recalling personal epi-
sodic information which requires re-experiencing or re-con-
structing unique past events. Indeed, functional neuroimaging 
and lesion studies have strongly sugge ed that the neural basis 
of the declarative self can be fra ionated into two functional-
ly independent systems. One system involves lateral cortical 
regions in the frontal (inferior frontal gyrus), parietal (inferior 
parietal lobe), and temporal (superior temporal gyrus, anterior 
temporal lobe) lobes as well as medial frontal (medial prefron-
tal cortex), parietal (precuneus), and temporal cortices (fusi-
form gyrus) (Binder and Desai, 2011). It supports semantic 
knowledge of facts about one’s own life and personal identity, 
and is associated with noetic awareness (i.e., a sense of simply 
“knowing” without contextual – including temporal – details). 
The content of semantic memory is usually abstra ed from 
actual experience and is therefore said to be conceptual (i.e., 
generalized). The other system is composed of the hippocam-
pus and surrounding medial cortices such as the entorhinal 
and parahippocampal cortices – the so-called medial tempo-
ral lobe, and also the medial prefrontal cortex and the precu-
neus (Moscovitch et al., 2016). It enables recollection of per-
sonal episodes, including information  ecific to the time and 
place of acquisition, and is associated with autonoetic aware-
ness. Thus, this ability goes beyond simply knowing “what” 
happened, “where” it happened and “when” it happened – the 
so-called www criteria (Suddendorf et al., 2009). It requires 
a subjective sense of time and of the self as the one who ex-
perienced the episode and possesses the memory. The agent’s 
personal relation with the  ecific episodic context (a context 
which includes the www criteria) is central for the mental ca-
pacity for reconstructing and reliving that episode.
As sugge ed by the neuroimaging data, the content 
of episodic memory depends heavily on retrieval of seman-
tic knowledge. Recalling, for instance, having a glass of wine 
during dinner last night requires retrieving the concepts of 
glass, wine and dinner. The semantic knowledge plays a role 
in encoding semantically meaningful events in episodic mem-
ory. Therefore, it is not surprising that the two memory sys-
tems described above are highly interconnected. There are 
strong reciprocal connections between the hippocampus in 
the episodic network and the precuneus as well as the lateral 
and anterior temporal cortices in the semantic network.
Having brought forth the conceptual and neurobiolog-
ical relations between semantic and episodic memory, it is 
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clear that, although both memory systems are fundamental 
parts of the declarative self, only episodic memory is associat-
ed with autonoetic awareness. Thus, there must be something 
about the hippocampus and associated cortices regarding 
tracking personal time which makes up the sense of a con-
tinuous self 7 that is part of the totality of the phenomenal 
experience. This would allow the phenomenal recollection 
during mental re-enactment of previous personal episodes. 
In fact, a key role for the hippocampus has been shown both 
in temporal organization of episodic memories (i.e., the dat-
ing of memories) and in remembering sequential organiza-
tion of events within memories. 
Regarding the labelling of “when” episodes occurred, 
studies have demonstrated that the hippocampal CA1 neu-
rons are central in the retrieval of both remote and recent ep-
isodes (Bartsch et al., 2011), and that the distinction between 
memories that are widely separated in time is given by the 
hippocampal a ivity patterns of CA1 neurons (Eichenbaum 
et al., 2014, p. 275). These studies indicate that shifts in the 
spatiotemporal firing patterns of CA1 neurons are associated 
with evolving temporal context representation, with gradual 
changes in the neural representation of the hippocampal CA1 
neural population over many days. Thus, it seems that these 
changes in the firing patterns of CA1 neurons represent the 
temporal labels of the temporally organized episodic memo-
ries. The retrieval of an episodic memory and its re-consolida-
tion with a new memory trace goes beyond the CA1 neurons 
– it depends on the entrainment of a dynamically distribut-
ed hippocampal-cortical network (Moscovitch et al., 2016). 
On the other hand, the preservation of the sequential order of 
events within episodes, including spatial and temporal contex-
tual details, depends upon the stability of the a ivity patterns 
of hippocampal CA3 neurons (Davachi and DuBrow, 2015). 
More stable firing patterns – compared to the dynamic CA1 
patterns discussed above – support the enduring feature of 
context-mediated episodic sequence. These findings indicate 
that both hippocampal subregions are critical in representing 
temporal information (involving ordered stimuli) across mul-
tiple timescales. While CA1 neurons show a gradually chang-
ing firing pattern across multiple days and are important in 
e ablishing the temporal gap between distant episodes, the 
stable response of CA3 neurons is critical in bridging events 
much closer in time and that supposedly belong together. 
In other words, CA1 represents how long ago an episode 
took place (“feeling of remoteness”) whereas CA3 represents 
the semantic cohesiveness of retrieved memories (“feeling of 
rightness”). Thus, the hippocampus is central for the event-se-
quencing a ect of time, in both short and long timescales. 
This is important not only for the reconstruction of episodic 
memory, but also for the construction and organization of fu-
ture planning – which will be discussed in the next section.
Neural correlates of MTT and 
self-referential cognition
MTT is the ability of an agent to mentally reconstruct 
past events as well as construct possible future events that in-
volves the self. When it is directed toward the past it is called 
episodic memory (see the previous section); when it points 
toward the future it has been called future planning or future 
thinking and it concerns thinking about a hypothetical per-
sonal future event which can be flexibly used to plan future 
a ions (Suddendorf et al., 2009). In recent years, the field of 
cognitive neuroscience has prolifically produced studies in-
vestigating the neural underpinnings of this mental phenom-
enon – particularly examining the relation between re-expe-
riencing one’s personal past and pre-experiencing an event by 
moving one’s self forward in time.
Neuroimaging research has revealed remarkable similar-
ities between remembering the past and imagining or simulat-
ing the future. Also, counterfactual thinking seems to a ivate 
the same pattern of brain regions but with more pronounced 
a ivity (in both strength and extension) in some particular ar-
eas. These studies, thus, suggest a common core brain network 
underlying episodic memory, imagination, and counterfactual 
thinking (Scha er et al., 2012; Van Hoeck et al., 2013), which 
includes the medial frontal, parietal and temporal lobes (in-
cluding the hippocampus) together with lateral parietal and 
temporal areas (overlapping the TPJ – see the section “Percep-
tion of time of external events”). These regions overlap sub-
stantially with the so-called default mode network (DMN)8. 
Activity in the DMN has been observed whenever the partic-
ipant is put in a passive test condition with no requirements 
of broadly monitoring the external environment (i.e., watch-
fulness). The DMN seems to maintain unfocused external 
attention while engaging internally cognitive processes (i.e., 
external sentinel and internal mentation). Several studies have 
observed that task contexts that encouraged or allowed for 
stimulus-independent thoughts (i.e., mind-wandering or day-
dreaming) are associated with increased a ivity in the DMN. 
However, these internal mentations include not only remem-
7 I take for granted that a neurotypical human adult subject has a sense of self extended in time (or continuous self), since it is impossible 
to conceive a neurotypical subject not extended in time (the very concept of “subject” must involve “continuation in time”). However, 
discussing how the representation of the self as an entity extended in time emerges or is built up is not the focus of the present arti-
cle – it is a debated philosophical topic with several conflicting theories. For a neurocognitive approach, please see Gallagher (2000).
8 The discovery of the DMN was entirely accidental since no early neuroimaging studies were explicitly designed to examine uncon-
strained mental states. The DMN was identified when researchers decided to analyse the data by looking for significant increase of 
activation during the control (passive) condition compared to the experimental (goal-directed task) condition. Activity of a specific set 
of brain regions increased during undirected mentation rest conditions compared to virtually all cognitive tasks. This set of regions was 
labelled as the “default mode network” (for a review, see Buckner et al., 2008).
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bering the past and imagining the future, but also taking the 
per ective of others and engaging in spatial navigation in the 
present time. Thus, virtually the same brain regions subserve 
the mental transportation of one’s self to events in the past or 
future and the imagination of self-referential situations which 
do not require this temporal displacement. These findings 
have complicated the hypothesis of mental time travel as an 
ability underpinned by an independent cognitive mechanism 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007). It is more likely that the con-
struct of mental time travel can be further reduced to several 
dissociable and more basic cognitive processes.
The aforementioned conceptual intricacy present in 
studies of timing (section “Perception of time of external 
events”) is also present in studies of MTT, which poses exper-
imental challenges in controlling for confounds of more ba-
sic processes that are part of the MTT ability. The process of 
MTT comprises the DMN to some extent. It is known that 
the DMN underlies internal mental exploration within the 
“self ” dimension, i.e., thoughts that are self-relevant or self-ref-
erential. Thus, it is acceptable to say that MTT is a self-reflex-
ive mental process. On the other hand, it still remains unclear 
what a ects of the DMN – or MTT function – reflect the 
conscious awareness of the existence of one’s self in subjective 
time (i.e., the temporal component) as opposed to the construc-
tive features of events of the declarative self (i.e., the narrative 
component) (Scha er et al., 2012). Several studies on self-ref-
erential imagination tasks favour a non-temporal per ective 
of cognitive processes such as episodic memory, pro ection, 
theory of mind, and spatial navigation. They defend that these 
processes are primarily narrative or constructive, that is, they 
rely upon the ability to retrieve disparate elements from a 
number of sources and bind details into coherent self-narra-
tives rather mentally travel through time (Eacott and Easton, 
2012), eliminating the need for a concept of mental time travel. 
Contrarily, studies with careful experimental designs targeting 
precisely processes of interest have tapped into  ecific con-
tributions of temporal and atemporal factors in MTT. These 
studies strongly indicate differences in neural representations 
between temporal and atemporal imagined scenarios (Nyberg 
et al., 2010) – within the DMN areas, the middle frontal cor-
tex showed greater a ivity in the non-present time (past and 
future) conditions compared to the present time condition.
Despite the great experimental challenge in isolating 
the cognitive processes associated with temporal factors from 
non-temporal cognitive a ivities and in balancing the cogni-
tive load of the temporal and atemporal conditions, neuro-
imaging studies have started to uncover the neural substrate 
involved in imagery structured in time. But there is still a long 
way to be explored.
How does MTT relate to other 
temporal systems in the brain?
Modest contributions of neuroimaging studies of MTT 
relate the ability to mentally project oneself to non-present 
times to the DMN, which is recruited during remembering 
the past and imagining the future. These findings in healthy 
adults are supported by two other types of studies. First, it has 
been observed that brain lesions and neurodegenerative dis-
eases which disrupt certain types of a ivity in the DMN also 
impair only the autonoetic component of self-reference tasks. 
For instance, Rosenbaum et al. (2007) report that amnesic in-
dividuals who cannot transport themselves into past or future 
personal episodes (i.e., are limited to a life about their imme-
diate environment) could nevertheless take the per ective of 
others by imagining what others might be thinking. Second, 
developmental studies have reported a relationship between 
memory and imagination, MTT and the functional archi-
tecture of the default-mode network in the developing brain 
(Østby et al., 2012). Thus, although we cannot make absolute 
claims about the neural correlates of autonoetic awareness 
during MTT, there is sufficient scientific evidence to allow 
the inference that it possibly has to do with the DMN.
So, considering that the DMN somehow underlies the 
subjective sense of time during MTT tasks, how would it be 
associated to the neural substrates of the also called “subjective 
time” in tasks of duration estimation and order judgements? 
In other words, how and to what extent are the internal (pro-
jective “travel”) and the external (watching) subjective time 
systems related?
The medial temporal lobe – which includes the hippo-
campus – is part of the DMN. The hippocampus is strongly 
connected to the striatum, which is one of the nuclei in the 
BG (see section “Perception of time of external events”). The 
striatum is one of the main components of the corticostria-
tal network which underlies metric timing, i.e., the explicit 
and implicit interval timing. Hippocampal lesions result in 
increased dopaminergic transmission in the striatum, which 
leads to long-term alterations in the accuracy and precision of 
estimating the duration of intervals (in the seconds-to-min-
utes range) (Meck, 2005). Therefore, patients with hippo-
campal amnesia, in addition to impaired episodic memory 
and future imagining, also underestimate retro ective du-
rations and underproduce pro ective durations. Conversely, 
the disruption of striatal dopaminergic circuits also impair 
the hippocampal function of constructing non-present time 
episodes. Parkinson’s disease patients, which have low dopa-
mine in the nigrostriatal pathway, exhibit an impaired ability 
in imagining future events, but have no difficulties in imagin-
ing atemporal scenarios (de Vito et al., 2012). Other studies 
have reported that schizophrenic patients, who have dopa-
minergic hyperfunction in the mesolimbic pathway (which 
includes the striatum), experience a distorted sense of conti-
nuity of self across time. They show pronounced difficulties 
in recalling events from their personal past and in generating 
events that might happen to them in the future (D’Argem-
beau et al., 2008).
These results strongly suggest a connection between 
the functional systems supporting internal subjective time 
awareness and external subjective time perception. The per-
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ception of the passage of time seems to be dependent on a 
balanced dopaminergic transmission between the striatum 
on the one hand, which is part of the metric timing network, 
and the hippocampus on the other hand, which is part of 
the DMN.
Conclusion
Neuroimaging evidence described in the present article 
points towards more than one subjective timing network. The 
two major “timekeeping” systems described in the literature 
are those related to the perception of time of external events 
and the internal mentation of projecting ourselves through 
time. It has been sugge ed that the former is underpinned by 
a network of brain regions that are part of the salience net-
work and the motor network. There is evidence that the lat-
ter is supported by the default mode network. In addition, the 
former could be seen as the timing mechanism for processing 
“the now” (by which the subject perceives events happening 
in the present moment), and the latter could be seen as the 
timing mechanism which allows the subject to engage in past 
and future episodes (processing the non-present moments). 
Also, the structuring in our minds of our subjective feeling of 
the passage of time seems to involve the integration of these 
two main systems, particularly via connections between the 
basal ganglia (striatum) and the hippocampus. Neuroimaging 
and neuropsychological data suggest that the dynamic cou-
pling between the externally- and internally-oriented tem-
poral attention supports temporal cognition across a broad 
range of stimulus contexts and temporal scales.
However, in neuropsychology, the concepts of work-
ing memory and attention cannot be defined (and, thus, as-
sessed) without resorting to the concept of timing, which in 
turn cannot be understood without making reference to the 
concepts of attention and working memory. This conceptu-
al circularity causes timing to both underpin and be under-
pinned by attention and working memory. Thus, attention 
and working memory are not simply confounding factors, as 
authors put it. For that, they would have to be task-related 
but non-temporal processes, which seems not to be the case 
since they belong in the very definition of “timing”. Similar-
ly (but to a lesser extent), the neuropsychological concept 
of subjective time is intertwined with that of self-reference. 
Conceptual confusion leads to incoherent experimental 
premises, dampening clarity in experimental design and 
data interpretation.
Given the extent of recent interest in MTT in cognitive 
neuroscience, it would be important to investigate the logical 
relations among key concepts. This is a philosophical task that 
should be conducted in cooperation with the field of neuro-
science. Understanding the neural structures and dynamics 
involved in temporal mental processes – including the com-
plex construct of MTT – demands ingenious experimental 
designs that cannot be achieved without conceptual and cat-
egorical clarity.
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